financing and the resulting shift in power led to the ultimate decline of Methodism in both countries.

In Chapter 7, David Paul Nord examines the financing of religious book publishing. He recounts how nonprofit publishing societies began with the purpose of free distribution of Bibles and tracts, and how the societies ended up as capitalist concerns selling some of their publications at "cost." This chapter provides a basic description of the pricing policies of these nonprofit organizations, but most economists will desire a more sophisticated analysis of these policies. For example, the societies as described seemed to price their publications at marginal cost, but there were substantial fixed costs involved which may or may not have been covered adequately by contributions and by revenues from sales. In addition, the funds generated from sales were intended to fund free distribution of Bibles and tracts, but there is little analysis of mechanisms by which the societies did (or could have) engaged in price discrimination.

Chapter 8, by Richard W. Pointer, asks whether the theological differences between Old School and New School Presbyterians carried over into differences in the degree of theological accommodation of market behavior. Whereas the Old School advocated "hard-line Calvinism," the New School "emphasized individual freedom and responsibility in attaining salvation." Despite these significant differences in the degree of human responsibility for and involvement in the process of salvation, Pointer concludes that both groups of Presbyterians espoused similar moral precepts in connection with economic behavior.

Part III (Chapters 9–11) examines "The Economics of Sectional Strife and Revival." It seems well-accepted that the tears in the fabric of Protestantism seen prior to the Civil War were due primarily to an ideological split over the issue of slavery. In Chapter 9, Richard Carwardine argues that, while rooted in disputes over slavery, much of the North-South strife among Methodists stemmed from disputes over control of denominational property upon dissolution of the Methodist Episcopal Church and from a Southern belief that Northern Methodists were motivated mainly by greed. In Chapter 10, Kenneth Startup summarizes the anti-mammonist rhetoric produced by antebellum Southern clergy. In Chapter 11, Kathryn T. Long describes the role of marketing in Protestant revivals (most notably, the New York-based "businessmen’s revival" of 1857–58) and the changing nature of newspaper coverage of these revivals.

Part IV’s “General Perspectives” contain Noll’s summary (in Chapter 12) of Protestant attitudes about money and markets during the antebellum period and Howe’s “Afterword” (in Chapter 13) summarizing the findings of the book and providing direction for future research.

God and Mammon will appeal to economic historians with an interest in the evolution of religious denominations in response to the growth of commercialism and capitalism. It will also provide useful background information on American religion for economists studying religion. Both of these groups will find greatest value in Chapters 6–11, which provide basic historic details about various facets of antebellum Protestantism. However, the specialized subject matter of the book and the lack of flow across its chapters probably make this book less appealing to a more general audience, including a general audience of Christian economists.

Finally, the book suffers from a lack of cohesion. The editor makes a valiant effort to tie the chapters together into a coherent whole, but the book reads as what it is—the published proceedings of a conference. Moreover, the dense typeface makes the book deceptively long, and it is a more difficult read than might appear at first blush.

In his introduction, Noll states that the book will be a success if "it convinces readers that connections among Protestants, money, and the market for the period 1790 to 1860 were multidimensional rather than unilinear, complex rather than simple, and driven at least as much by the religious as by the market forces at play." The book does succeed in showing that Protestantism and money shared complex interdependencies that historians may not have fully recognized. The book also succeeds in shedding light on the financial underpinnings of the early nineteenth-century growth of Protestantism. It is less clear that the average economist will find research on these topics particularly compelling.

The Economic Person: Acting and Analyzing

Reviewed by Kevin E. Schmiesing, Research Fellow, Acton Institute.

For those interested in interaction between economics and other disciplines, the appearance of Peter Danner’s The Economic Person is an encouraging sign. Danner’s book is a strong effort to overcome the liabilities of academic specialization by synthesizing the insights of philosophy and economics around the concept of the “economic person.”

Danner’s discussion is framed by the claim that the economist is both scientist and practitioner. Economics as a science is analysis of the way people go about meeting their material needs. Economics as practice, however, is the very activity of meeting material needs and, therefore, all people are economists in this sense. Economic activity, then, is pervasive; people undertook it long before economics as a science existed and people continue to “do economics” even if they are ignorant of its theoretical dimension.

Those doing economics, Danner observes, are also persons. As such, their economic acts will also have a moral dimension. Danner attempts to stake out a middle ground
between those who claim economics is a “moral science” and those who see no moral implications to economics. "What is meant here," he writes in a key passage, is that economic acts are both moral and economic. They are economic in that they are necessary means for people to act and survive. At the same time the acts are moral or immoral insofar as they relate to dealing justly with other people and in using material things as means to their ultimate good and purpose (p. 44).

This statement of the relation between economics and morality caps a simplified but helpful summary of the history of economic thought. This summary exhibits one of Danner’s gifts: his balance and consequent avoidance of polemical argument. An example of this quality is his characterization of the development of economics as an empirical discipline, beginning with Adam Smith and given impetus by Auguste Comte. As economics became dependent on empirical method, Danner points out, the humanistic dimension that had been part and parcel of Greek and medieval commentary on economics dissipated. While Danner’s own project is to bring these two aspects of economics (humanism and empiricism) back together, he does not see the honing of economics as a science as an unmitigated disaster. Instead, he gives full credit to empirical science for the material benefits it has helped to provide. In short, the development of economics along empirical lines involved trade-offs, entailing both negative and positive results.

As is generally the case with interdisciplinary ventures, the treatment given multiple disciplines in this book is not entirely even. Danner, a professor emeritus of economics at Marquette University, is clearer in his discussions of economics than he is in his discussions of philosophy. His philosophical allegiance is to personalism, more specifically the personalism of Emmanuel Mounier and Max Scheler. The section on Mounier is as good as its subject—offering insightful descriptions of what a person is (an embodied spirit) and what the implications of this fact are, but ultimately fuzzy about exactly what obligations are stipulated by an ethical system arising out of such a philosophy.

Fortunately, Danner’s philosophical clarity increases as the book progresses, because he leaves Mounier behind and focuses on Scheler. Drawing on Scheler, he offers criteria for creating “value hierarchies.” The creation of such hierarchies—the ranking of the values one espouses—ought not to be arbitrary, in Scheler’s (and Danner’s) view, but should be based on one’s perception that certain values are higher than others. This ranking uses objective criteria such as “spiritual values are to be preferred over material values” (p. 88).

Overall, Danner is sufficiently respectful of both economics and philosophy to be largely successful in his attempt at interdisciplinary synthesis. His appreciation of economics, for instance, preserves the book from the sweeping denunciations of the market characteristic of many attempts to bring ethics to bear on economics. So, for example, he argues that consumerism, “although abetted by the market, is more a moral than an economic problem” (p. 95). Throughout his analysis, Danner is careful, as expressed on page 72, to “preserve each science’s distinctness” while demonstrating “how insights from one field may enrich those from another.”

Though Danner himself is Catholic, this book is not explicitly religious and one assumes he intended it to be attractive to an audience beyond Christian circles. For Christians, what one thinks of Danner’s approach will probably depend on how one views the moral system derived from Scheler’s value theory. While it leads to statements such as “moral value is subjective” (p. 93), Danner’s explanation shows that Scheler’s ideas do not necessarily countenance moral relativism. This reviewer believes that Scheler’s system is ultimately compatible with orthodox Christianity and, in the attempt to relate moral philosophy and economics, Danner’s choice of personalism is a viable and fruitful one. Other approaches are possible, as intimated by Danner’s brief treatment of John Finnis’s natural law morality, which uses the concept of “basic goods” (pp. 85–86).

Danner draws on a fascinating variety of sources, from Aristotle to Alasdair MacIntyre, but the book still suffers from inadequate attention to other attempts to relate ethics and economics. Danner cites the work of the Association for Social Economics and various scholars connected to it, but he does not deal with the Association of Christian Economists beyond a brief mention. Catholic scholars, too, have labored in this field. The German economist, Heinrich Pesch, for instance, was an important voice of opposition to the uncoupling of economics from ethics. More recently Richard Bayer (1999) has written on the promise of personalism as a synthesis of the insights of economics and Christianity.

The Economic Person, then, is not a comprehensive treatment of its subject. It is, nonetheless, a significant project: the investigation and description of the connections between economics and philosophy. It seems clear that Danner’s focus—the person—is the most fruitful avenue to take. Others may dispute the details beyond this central point, but it is surely true that being fully human requires that students of every discipline consider the moral implications of their work.

Reference